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Introduction
Do better functioning  financial  intermediaries  - financial  intermediaries  that are better at
ameliorating  information  asymmetries  and facilitating  transactions  - exert a causal  influence  on
economic  growth? If they do, what determines  the level of financial  intermediary  development?
Providing  evidence  on causality will  influence  the degree of urgency  attached  to policy  reforms
designed  to promote financial  intermediary  development.  Providing  evidence  on the causes of financial
intermediary  development  will help  policymakers  design reforms  i:hat  indeed  promote  growth-enhancing
financial  sector development.  Furthermore,  evidence  on causality  will help  resolve  a long  debate  among
econornists.  A rich literature emphasizes  the causal  role of intermediaries  in spurring  growth [Bagehot
1873;  Schumpeter  1912]. For instance,  Alexander  Hamilton  (178  1) argued  that "banks  were the
happiest  engines  that ever were invented"  for creating economic  growth. Others,  however,  question
whether  finance  exerts a first-order,  causal  impact  on economic  activity  [Robinson  1952;  Lucas 1988].
President  John Adams  (1819) even  asserted  that banks harm  the "morality,  tranquility,  and even  wealth"
of nations.
This  paper rigorously  addresses  the issue of causality  and also provides  suggestive  evidence
concerning  the determinants  of financial  development.  Specifically,  we evaluate  (1) whether  the level  of
financial  intermediary  development  exerts a causal  influence  on economic  growth  and (2) whether
cross-country  differences  in particular  legal  and accounting  system  characteristics  (e.g., the legal rights
of creditors, the efficiency  of contract  enforcement,  and accounting  standards)  explain  cross-country
differences  in the level  of financial  intermediary  development.  While past work shows  that the level of
financial  development  is a good predictor  of economic  growth, these results  do not settle  the issue of2
causality.' Financial  development  may simply  be a leading  indicator,  rather than an underlying  cause  of
economic  growth. This paper uses new data and new econometric  procedures  to shed considerably
more light  on the issue of causality  while  also illuminating  a close  empirical  association  between  key
legal and accounting  characteristics  and financial  intermediary  development.  In conducting  this analysis,
we evaluate  the predictions  that emerge  from an array of theoretical  models. 2
Methodologically,  the paper uses  two econometric  techniques  to study causality.  First,  we use a
pure cross-sectional  estimator,  where data for 71 countries  are averaged over the period 1960-1995,
with one observation  per country. As in much  of the cross-country  growth literature,  the dependent
variable  is the growth rate of the real  per capita  Gross Domestic  Product (GDP). The regressors
include  a variable  of particular  interest,  in our case financial  intermediary  development,  along  with a set
of conditioning  information. Unlike  much  of the literature,  we use instrumental  variables  to extract  the
exogenous  component  of financial  intermediary  development.  Specifically,  LaPorta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1997, 1998;  henceforth  LLSV)  note that most countries  can be divided  into
countries  with predominantly  English,  French,  German,  or Scandinavian  legal origins  ancd  that countries
typically  obtained  their legal systems  through  occupation  or colonization. Thus, we view  legal origin  as
an exogenous  "endowment."  After  extending  the LLSV sample  from 49 to 71 countries,  we use the
legal origin  indicators  as instrumental  variables  to extract  the exogenous  component  of financial
intermediary  development.
' King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1998) show that measures of financial  intermediary development
predict economic growth over the next  18 to 30 years in a broad-cross section of countries.  Further, Neusser and Kugler
(1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) find that financial development Granger-causes  economic periformance  in time-
series studies of growth and financial development.
2  See, for instance, Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith
(1991), and King and Levine (1993b).3
The second method  for examining  causality  uses panel data and exploits  the cross-country  and
time-series  dimensions  of the data. We assemble  a panel dataset, vith data averaged over each  of the
seven  5-year  intervals  composing  the period 1960-1995. We use two Generalized  Method-of-
Moments  (GM  dynamic  panel estimators  that correct inherent  problems  with the purely  cross-
sectional  estimator. Specifically,  these estimators  address  the econometric  problems  induced  by
country-specific  effects,  endogeneity,  and  the routine use of lagged dependent  variables  in growth
regressions  [Arellano  and Bond 1991;  Holtz-Eakin,  Newey, and  Rosen 1990]. In the first GMM  panel
estimator,  the strategy  for addressing  possible  omitted  variable  bias created  by country-specific  effects  is
to difference  the regression  equation. Thus, we first take differences  to eliminate  country-specific
effects  and thereby  remove omitted  variable  bias. Next, we instrurnent  the right-hand-side  variables  (the
differenced  values of the original  regressors)  using lagged  values of the original  regressors  (measured  in
levels)  as instruments. This last step removes  the inconsistency  arising  from simultaneity  bias,  including
biases  induced  by the differenced  lagged  dependent  variable. This dfference dynamic-panel  estimator
has increasingly  been used in studies  of growth. [Caselli,  Esquivel,  and LeFort 1996;  Easterly,  Loayza,
and Montiel  1997].
The second GMM  dynamic  panel estimator  goes beyond  the difference dynamic-panel  estimator.
The problem  with the difference estimator  is that it generally  suffer  s from weak instruments,  which
yields  large  biases  in finite  simples  and poor precision  even  asymptotically  [Alonso-Borrego  and
Arellano  1996;  Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 1977]. Specifically,  lagged  values of the levels  of the
original  regressors  frequently  make weak instruments  for the differenced  values of the regressors  used
in the dynamic-panel  equation. This occurs in the current  setting  if lagged  values of financial
development  do not forecast changes  in financial  development.  To mitigate  this problem,  we use a4
system estimator.  Besides  the difference  dynamic-panel  equations  where the instruments  are lagged
levels  of the original  regressors,  we simultaneously  estimate  the original,  levels equation  where  the
instruments  are lagged  values of the differenced  regressors  [Arellano  and Bover 1995]. By mitigating
the weak  instruments  problem,  this system estimator  offers  dramatic  improvements  in both efficiency
and consistency  in Monte Carlo simulations  [Blundell  and  Bond 1997].  Thus, this paper uses  two
procedures  to address  causality:  a pure cross-sectional  estimator  and a GMM  dynamic  panel  technique,
with both a difference  and a system  estimator.
While  subject  to some  qualifications,  the two methods  produce  very consistent  findings
regarding  causality:  financial  intermediary  development  exerts  a large, causal  irnpact on economic
growth. In conducting  this research,  we construct a new dataset  and focus on three measures  of
financial  intermediation.  One measures  the overall  size of the financial  intermediation  sector; the second
measures  whether  commercial  banking  institutions,  or the central  bank, is conducting  the
intermediation,  and the third measures  the extent to which  financial  institutions  funnel credit  to private
sector activities.  Our financial  development  indicators  improve  on past measures  by (i) more accurately
deflating  nominal  measures  of intermediary  liabilities  and assets,  (ii) more comprehensively  measuring
the banking  sector, and (iii)  more carefully  distinguishing  who is conducting  the intermediation  and to
where the funds  are flowing. While  the financial  intermediary  indicators  are still  imperfect  measures  of
how well  financial  intermediaries  research firms,  monitor  managers,  mobilize  savings,  pool risk, and
ease  transactions,  these three measures  provide  more inforrnation  about financial  intermediary
development  than past measures  and together they provide  a more  accurate picture than if we used only
a single  measure.  Moreover,  they produce similar  conclusions.  Econometrically,  the results indicate
that the close  empirical  association  between  finance  and growth  is not the result of simultaneity  or5
omitted  variable  bias. The exogenous  component  of financial  intermediary  development  is positively
correlated  with economic  growth. Economically,  the impact  of finance  on growth is large. For
example,  the estimated  coefficients  suggest  that if Argentina  had enjoyed  the level of financial
intermediary  development  of the average  developing  country during  the 1960-95  period they  would
have experienced  about one percentage  point faster real per capita  GDP growth  per annum  over this
period.
Next, the paper searches  for legal and accounting  determinants  of cross-country  differences  in
financial  intermediary  development.  The data show  that cross-country  differences  in legal systems  and
accounting  standards  help determine  cross-country  differences  in financial  development.  While  every
legal/accounting  indicator  is not significantly  correlated  with every  financial  development  indicator,  the
legal/accounting  indicators  taken together are  jointly significant  at the 0.01 level  with all of the financial
intermediary  development  measures. The data suggest  that countries  with legal and regulatory  systems
that give  a high  priority  to creditors  receiving  the full present  value  of their claims  on corporations  have
better functioning  financial  intermediaries  than countries  where  the legal system  provides  weaker
support  to creditors. Moreover,  contract  enforcement  seems  to matter even  more than the formal  legal
and regulatory  codes. Countries  that efficiently  impose compliance  with laws  tend to have better
developed  financial  intermediaries  than countries  where enforcement  is more  lax. Finally,  the paper
shows  that information  disclosure  matters for financial  developmernt.  Countries  where corporations
publish  relatively  comprehensive  and accurate financial  statements  have  better developed  financial
intermediaries  than countries  where  published  information  on corporations  is less reliable. Taken
together, this paper's findings  suggest  that legal and regulatory  changes  that strengthen  creditor  rights,6
contract  enforcement,  and accounting  practices  will  boost financial  intermediary  development  and
induce  a rapid  acceleration  in economic  growth.
This  paper complements  recent  microeconomic  efforts aimed  at reconciling  wheither  financial
development  is simply  a good predictor  of economic  growth. Rajan and Zingales  (1998)  show  that, in
countries  with well-developed  financial  systems,  industries  that are naturally  heavy  users,  of external
finance  grow relatively  faster  than other industries. Alternatively,  in countries  with poorily  developed
financial  systems,  industries  that are naturally  heavy  users of external  finance  grow more  slowly  than
other industries. Using firm-level  data,  Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1996)  show  that firms  in
countries  with better developed  financial  systems  grow faster than they could  have  grown without  this
access. While  these microeconomic  studies  must respectively  identify  (a) the "natural"  tendency  of
industries  to use external  funding  and (b) how fast firms  would have grown  in different  financial
environments,  the results support  the conclusion  that better financial  systems  facilitate  economic
development. 3
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows. Section  II presents  the results  on causality,  using
purely cross-sectional  data, while Section  III discusses  and presents  the differenced  and system  dynamic
panel results. Section  IV provides  information  on how the legal and accounting  environment  explain
cross-country  differences  in financial  development.  Section V concludes.
3 Furthermore,  this  paper  complements  an innovative  event  study  by Jayaratne  and Strahan  (1996).  They  show  that  when
individual  states of the United States  relaxed  intrastate  branching restrictions  the quality  of bank loans rose and per capita
GDP growth  accelerated.7
II. Finance  and Growth: Causality  Using Purely  Cross-Sectional  Anyses
To examine  whether  financial  intermediary  development  exerts a causal  impact  on economic
growth, we need measures  of financial  intermediary  development.  We also need instrumental  variables
to extract  the exogenous  component  of financial  development.  This section  discusses  the measures  of
financial  intermediary  development  and then describes  the indicators  of national  legal system  origin,
which  we use as instrumental  variables  in the purely  cross-sectional  ;malysis.  Finally,  the section
examines  the causal  relationship  between  financial  intermediary  development  and growth.
A. Financial  intermediary  development
Numerous  theoretical  models  show  that economic  agents  may form financial  intermediaries  to
mitigate  the costs of acquiring  information  and conducting  transactions. 4 More specifically,  financial
intermediaries  emerge  to lower the costs of researching  potential  investments,  exerting  corporate
control,  managing  risk, and mobilizing  savings. Theory  further  suggests  that, by providing  these
services  to the economy,  financial  intermediaries  influence  savings  and allocation  decisions  in ways  that
may  alter long-run  growth rates.'  Thus, modem  economic  theory provides  an intellectual  framework
for understanding  how, ceteris paribus,  countries  with "better" financial  intermediaries  - financial
intermediaries  that are better at acquiring  information,  exerting  corporate control, managing  risk, and
mobilizing  savings  - would grow faster than countries  with less developed  financial  systems.
To evaluate  the empirical  predictions  advanced  by a variety of theoretical  models  regarding  the
relationship  between  finance  and growth,  therefore,  we would ideally  like  to construct  measures  of the
ability  of different  financial  systems  to research  and identify  profitable  ventures, monitor  and control
managers,  ease risk management  and facilitate  resource  mobilization. It is impossible,  however,  to
4 See Boyd  and Prescott (1986), Diamond  (1984) and the reviews  by Gertler (1988) and Levine (1997).
For example,  see Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1990),  Bencivenga  and Smith (1991), and King and Levine  (1993b).8
construct accurate, comparable measures of these financial  services for a broad cross-section of
countries over the past 35 years.  Consequently, to measure the provision of financial services, this
paper constructs three indicators of financial intermediary development. While each has particular
strengths and weaknesses, we improve upon past measures of financial intermediary development.
LIQUID LIABILITIES equals liquid liabilities  of the financial system (currency plus demand
and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial  intermediaries) divided by GDP.  This is a
typical measure of "financial depth" and thus of the overall size of the financial intermecdiary  sector
[King and Levine 1993  a].  LIQUID LIABILITIES, however, does not consider the allocation of capital;
it is just an indicator of size.  Thus, LIQUID LIABILITIES may not accurately reflect the provision of
financial services  in an economy.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK equals the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by
commercial  bank plus central bank assets.  COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK measures the degree to
which the banks versus the central banks allocates society's savings. The intuition underlying this
measure is that banks are more likely to identify profitable investments, monitor managers, facilitate risk
management, and mobilize savings than central banks.
PRIVATE CREDIT equals the value of credits by financial  intermediaries to the private sector
divided by GDP.  This measure of financial development is more than a simple measure of financial
sector size. PRIVATE CREDIT isolates credit issued to the private sector, as opposed to credit issued
6 One way  this paper improves  upon past measures  of financial  intermediary  development  is by accurately  deflating
nominal measures  of financial  intermediary  liabilities  and assets. Specifically,  while financial intermediary  balance  sheet
items are measured  at the end of the year, GDP is measured  over  the year. Some authors try to correct  for this problem  by
using an average  of financial  intermediary  balance  sheet items  in year t and t-l and dividing  by GDP measured  in year  t
King and Levine  1993a]. This, however  does not fully resolve  the distortion,  especially  in highly inflationary
environments. This  paper deflates  end-of-year  financial  balance  sheet  items  by end of year consumer  price indices  (CPI)
and deflates  the GDP series  by the annual CPI. Then, we compute  the average  of the real  financial balance  sheet  item  in
year t and t-1 and divide  this average by real GDP measured  in year t.  This  is described  more  fully in the data appendix.9
to governments, government agencies, and public enterprises.  Furl;hermore, it excludes credits issued
by the central bank.  PRIVATE CREDIT is our preferred indicator because it improves on other
measures of financial development used in the literature.  For example, King and Levine (1993a,b) use a
measure of gross claims on the private sector divided by GDP.  But, this measure includes credits issued
by the monetary authority and government agencies, whereas PRIVATE CREDIT includes only credits
issued by banks and other financial intermediaries. Also, Levine and Zervos (1998) and Levine (1998)
use a measure of deposit money bank credits to the private sector diivided  by GDP over the period
1976-1993. That measure, however, does not include credits to the private sector by non-deposit
money banks and it only covers the period 1976-1993. PRIVATE C(REDIT  is a broader measure of
credit issuing financial intermediation and its time dimension is twice as long, 1960-1995. While
PRIVATE CREDIT does not directly  measure the amelioration of information and transaction costs, we
interpret higher levels of PRIVATE CREDIT as indicating higher levels of financial services and
therefore greater financial intermediary development.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the financial intermediary development indicators.  The
values are computed as averaged over the period 1960-95.  There is considerable variation across
countries.  For example, PRIVATE CREDIT ranges from a low of 4 percent of GDP in Zaire to a high
of 141 in Switzerland.
B. Legal origin
Comparative legal scholars place countries into four major legal families,  either English, French,
German, or Scandinavian, that descended from Roman law [Reynolds and Flores 1996].  As described
by Glendon et al. (1982), Roman law was compiled under the directjion of Byzantine Emperor Justinian
in the sixth century.  Over subsequent centuries, the Glossators and Commentators interpreted, adapted,10
and amended  the Law [Berman  1997]. In the 17 db and 18' centuries  the Scandinavian  countries
formalized  their own  legal codes. The Scandinavian  legal systems  have remained  relatively  unaffected
from the far reaching  influences  of the German and especially  the French  Civil  Codes.
Napoleon  directed  the writing  of the French Civil  Code  in 1804. He made it a priority  to secure
the adoption  of the Code  in France and all conquered  territories,  including  Italy,  Poland, the low
countries,  and the Habsburg  Empire. Also, France extended  her legal influence  to parts of the Near
East, Northern  and Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Indochina,  Oceania,  French  Guyana,  and the French Caribbean
islands  during  the colonial  era. Furthermore,  The French Civil  Code was a major influence  on the
Portuguese  and Spanish  legal systems,  which  helped  spread  the French  legal tradition  to Central and
South America.
The German  Civil  Code (Burgerliches  Gesetzbuch)  was completed  almost  a centuiy later in
1896.  The German  Code  exerted a big influence  on Austria  and Switzerland,  as well as China  (and
hence  Taiwan),  Czechoslovakia,  Greece, Hungary,  Italy, and  Yugoslavia.  Also, the German  Civil  Code
heavily  influenced  the Japanese  Civil  Code, which helped  spread  the German  legal tradition to Korea.
Unlike  these  Civil  Law countries,  the English  legal system  is common  law, where the laws  were
primarily  formed  by  judges trying  to resolve  particular  cases.
This paper  takes  national  legal origin as an exogenous  "endowment"  since  the EnglLish,  French,
and German  systems  were spread  primarily  through conquest  and imperialism.  It is critical  to recognize,
however,  that exogeneity  is not a sufficient  condition  for economically  meaningful  instrumnental
variables. It must  also be the case that there are good reasons  for believing  that legal origin  is closely
connected  to factors  that directly  affect  the behavior  of financial  intermediaries.  Here, we rely on LLSV
(1998). They  trace differences  in legal origin  through to differences  in the legal rules covering  secured11
creditors,  the efficiency  of contract  enforcement,  and the quality  of accounting  standards. Thus, legal
origin  is connected  to legal  and regulatory  characteristics  defining  financial  intermediary  activities. We
discuss  the relationship  between  legal origin  and the legal and regulatory  environment  in more detail
below. Here, note  that legal  origin  has a profound  impact  on financial  intermediary  development.
Table  2 presents  regressions  of the financial  intermediary  development  indicators  on the dummy
variables  for English,  French  and German  legal origin, relative  to Scmndinavian  origin  (which  is captured-
in the constant). We extend  the LLSV  (1998) data set from 44 countries  (with  financial  intermediary
data) to 71. Some  ofthe regressions  also control for the level  of real per capita GDP.  The major
message  is that countries  with a German  legal origin have  better developed  financial  intermediaries.
While  countries  with a French legal  tradition  tend to have less  well-developed  institutions  than other
countries  on average,  this result does not hold when controlling  for the overall  level of economic
development  . In contrast,  the dummy  variable  for a German  legal  tradition  enters with a positive and
significant  coefficient  even  after controlling  for the level of real  per capita  GDP. Also, as indicated  by
the P-values  of the F-test that the explanatory  variables  do not explain  the dependent  variable,  the legal
origin  variables  explain  a significant  fraction  of the cross-country  variation  of the financial  intermediary
development  indicators.
C. Legal origin and growth in a pure cross-section of countries
1. Cross-sectional estimator
The pure cross-sectional  analysis  uses data averaged  over 1960-95,  such that there is one
observation  per country. The basic  regression  takes the form:
GROWTH;  =  a  + ,BFINANCEi  + y' [CONDITIONING SET]; +  Si,12
where the dependent variable, GROWTH, equals real per capita GDP growth, FINANCE equals either
LIQUID LIABILITIES, COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL BANK, or PRIVATE CREDIT, and
CONDITIONING SET represents a vector of conditioning information  that controls for ot]her  factors
associated with economic growth.'
To examine whether cross-country variations in the exogenous component of financiial
intermediary development explain cross-country variations in the rate of economic growth, the legal
origin indicators are used as instrumental variables for FINANCE. Econometrically, given the vector of
instrumental variables, Z, and assuming that E[e]=O and that E[ss'1=2,  where Q2  is unrestricted, this
implies a set of orthogonality conditions, E[Z'e]=O.  This produces an instrumental variable estimator of
the coefficients in the cross-country growth equation.  After computing these GMM estimates, the
standard Lagrange-Multiplier test of the overidentifying restrictions assesses whether the instrumental
variables are associated with growth beyond their ability to explain cross-country variation in banking
sector development.
2. Conditioning information set
To examine the sensitivity of the results, we experiment with different conditioning information
sets . We seek to reduce the chances that the cross-country growth regression either omits an important
variable or includes a select group of regressors that yields a favored result.  We report the results with
three conditioning information sets.  The simple conditioning information set includes the constant, the
logarithm of initial per capita GDP and initial level of educational attainment. The initial income
variable is used to capture the convergence effect and school attainment is used to control for the level
7Due  to the potential  nonlinear  relationship  between  econoric  growth  and the assortment  of economic  indicators,  we use
natural logarithms  of the regressors.13
of human  capital. The  policy conditioning  information  set includes  the simple  conditioning  information
set plus measures  of government  size,  inflation,  the black market  exchange  rate premium,  and openness
to international  trade.'  Thefill conditioning  information  set includes  the policy  conditioning
information  set plus measures  of political  stability  (the number  of revolutions  and coups and the number
of assassinations  per thousand inhabitants  (Banks 1994)) and ethnic  diversity  (Easterly  and Levine
1997). Thus, for each of the three financial  intermediary  development  indicators,  we present  regression
results  for the (i) simple,  (ii) policy,  and  (iii)  full conditioning  information  sets.
3. Regression results
The results indicate  a very strong  connection  between  the exogenous  component  of financial
intermediary  development  and long-run  economic  growth. Table  3 summarizes  the purely  cross-
sectional  instrumental  variable  results  for nine  regressions,  where the instrumental  variables  are the legal
origin  variables.  For brevity,  we report only  the coefficients  on the financial  development  indicators.
Each of the three financial  intermediary  development  indicators  (PRIVATE  CREDIT,  COMMERCIAL-
CENTRAL  BANK, LIQUID  LIABILITIES)  is significantly  correlated  with economic  growth  at the
five percent significance  level in the simple,  policy,  and full  conditioning  information  set regressions.
The exogenous  component  of financial  intermediary  development  is closely  tied to long-run  rates of per
capita GDP  growth. Furthermore,  the data do not reject the orthogonality  conditions  at the ten percent
level  in any  of the nine  regressions. The inability  to reject the orthogonality  conditions  plus  the result
that the instruments  are highly  correlated  with financial  intermediary  development  (Table  2) suggest  that
the instruments  are appropriate. These  results  indicate  that the stronig  link  between  financial
development  and growth is not due to simultaneity  bias.
8 The  black  market  exchange  rate  premium  is frequently  used  as an overall  index  of  trade,  exchange  rate,  and  price
distortions  [Easterly  1994;  Levine  and Zervos  19931.  The  inflation  rate  and size  of the  government  serve  as indicators  of
macroeconomic  stability  [Easterly  and  Rebelo  1993;  Fischer  19931.14
Besides suggesting that greater financial intermediary development causes faster economic
growth, the results indicate an economically large relationship.  For example, India's  value of
PRIVATE CREDIT over the 1960-95 period was 19.5 percent of GDP, while the mean value for
developing countries was 25 percent of GDP.  The results suggest that an exogenous improvement in
PRIVATE CREDIT in India that had pushed it to the sample mean for developing countries would have
accelerated real per capita GDP growth by about 0.6 percentage point per year.9 Similarly,  if Argentina
had moved from its value of PRIVATE CREDIT (16) to the developing country sample mean, it would
have grown more than one percentage point faster per year.  This is large considering that growth only
averaged about 1.8 percent per year over this period.
D.  Sensitivity  Analyses
We have conducted a number of sensitivity analyses to gauge the robustness of these findings.
For instance, the  two-stage least squares estimator gives similar results to the GMM estimator reported
above.  We have also restricted the sample to those countries for which LLSV (1998) collect legal data.
This did not alter the results.  Furthermore, as control variables, we used measures of the efficiency  of
the bureaucracy and the level of bureaucratic red tape [Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995], as well
as measures of terms of trade changes and population growth.  These did not alter our findlings.  We
controlled for the level of stock market development (Levine and Zervos 1998) without chianging  the
conclusion that financial intermediary development exerts a positive impact on long-run growth.  We
also experimented with two additional measures of financial intermediary development.  One measure
equals deposit money bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP.  This is smaller then PRIVATE
CREDIT, which also includes other financial intermediaries. The second additional measure equals the
9 To get  this, recall  that  the  regressors  are in logs  and note  that  the ln(25)  -ln(19.5)  = 0.25. Then,  use  the  smallest
parameter  on PRIVATE  CREDIT  from Table 3, which  equals  2.5, so that  2.5*(0.25)  = 0.63.15
ratio of deposit  money  bank domestic  assets to GDP  (and so does not distinguish  between credits  issued
to the private  sector and those issued  to the public  sector). These  two additional  measures  also suggest
that better  financial  intermediaries  induce  faster economic  growth. Finally,  we assess the sensitivity  of
our findings  to outliers,  but we do not find any particular  influential  observations  materially  affecting  the
coefficient  on financial  intermediation  or its significance.
III. Finance  and Growth: Causality  Using  Panel Procedures
After  describing  the underlying  econometrics,  this section  presents  results on causality  using
dynamic  panel estimators. Here, we use panel estimation  procedlures.  The panel consists of data  for 74
countries  over  the period 1961-1995. We average  data over non-overlapping,  five-year  periods,  so that
data permitting  there are seven  observations  per country  (1961-65;  1966-70;  1971-75;  etc.). Thus,
when we use the subscript  "t" to designate  a time-period,  it represents  one of these five-year  averages.
A.  GMM Estimators  for Dynamic Panel Models
We use Generalized-Method-of-Moments  dynamic  panel  estimators  that control  for unobserved
country-specific  effects, the endogeneity  of explanatory  variables, time-specific  effects, and the use
of lagged  dependent  variables.' 0 Consider the following  regression  equation,
yt  -yi,-  = (a  - l)y-,,  + 6 Xi,, + Vi +  t(1)
'° The Generalized  Method  of Moments (GMM)  estimator  was proposed  by Chamberlain  (1984), Holtz-Eakin,  Newey
and Rosen  (1988),  Arellano  and Bond (1991), and Arellano  and Bover  (1995), and has been applied to cross-country
studies  by, among  others, Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Easterly,  Loayza and Montiel (1997), and Fajnzylber,
Lederman,  and Loayza  (1998). For a concise presentation  of the GMM  estimator  addressed  to a general audience,  see the
appendix  of Easterly,  Loayza,  and Montiel (1997) and chapter 8 of Baltagi  (1995).16
where y represents  the logarithm  of real per capita GDP, X represents  the set of explanatory
variables  (other than lagged per capita GDP), 77 is an unobserved  country-specific  effect, e is the
error term, and the subscripts  i'and t represent country and time period, respectively.  Tl  1'he
dependent  variable in equation (1) is the period's average growth'rate. We can rewrite eq[uation  (1)
as a lagged-dependent  variable equation as follows,
IYit  = aYia-t + ,'  Xi,  + 77i  + 0i  t  (2)
The usual  method of dealing with the country-specific  effect in the context of panel data has
been to first-difference  the regression  equation (Anderson  and Hsiao 1981). In this way the specific-
effect is directly  eliminated  from the estimation process. First-differencing  equation (2), awe  obtain
Yi  - = a(yita 1i -yij-2)  + ,6i  (X,  Xij  ) + (-i  - si t-)  (3)
The use of instruments  is again required to deal with two issues: first, the likely endogeneity
of the explanatory  variables,  X; and, second, the new error term, ei  - ej,t-j  is correlated with the
differenced  lagged  dependent  variable, yj,t-l  -Yi,t-2.  This second issue arises by consiruction
when we difference  equation (2).
We would  like to relax the assumption that all the explanatory  variables  are strictly
exogenous  (that is, that they are uncorrelated  with the error term at all leads and lags).  Relaxing  this
We also include  time  dummies  to account  for time-specific  effects.17
assumption  allows for the possibility  of simultaneity and reverse causality,  which are very likely
present in growth regressions. We adopt the assumption  of weak exogeneity  of the explanatory
variables, in the sense that they  are assumed  to be uncorrelated  with future realizations  of the error
term.  This weaker assumption  means that current explanatory  variables may  be affected by past and
current growth rates but not by future ones.  In practice we assume that all variables  are weakly
12 exogenous.
Under the assumptions  that (a) the error term,  e,  is not serially correlated, and (b) the
explanatory  variables, X, are wealdy  exogenous, the following  moment  conditions  apply to the
lagged  dependent  variable and the set of explanatory  variables:
E[y; t  , 3 (s,,-  ,i)t-J =  0  for s >  2;  t  =3  ..., T  (4)
E[Xi 1t-8 * (e,ij  - .t_1)]  =  0  for s > 2  t=3, ...,T  (5)
We use a consistent  GMM estimator  based on these moment conditions. We refer to this estimator
as the difference  estimator.
There are, however, conceptual  and statistical shortcomings  with this estimator.
Conceptually,  we would like to study not only the time-series relationship  between financial
development  and per capita GDP growth but also their cross-country  relationship,  which is
eliminated  in the case of the simple  difference  estimator.  Statistically,  Alonso-Borrego  and Arellano
(1996) and Blundell  and Bond (1997)  show that when the lagged dependent  and the explanatory
'2Population  growth  rate  and the  growth  rate  of the  terms  of trade  are  assuned  exogenous,  but  these  variables  are  only
included  in the regressions  when  we conduct  sensitivity  analyses.18
variables  are persistent over time, lagged  levels of these variables are weak instruments  for the
regression  equation in differences. The instruments' weakness  has repercussions  on both the
asymptotic  and small-sample  performance  of the difference  estimator.  As the variables' persistence
increases,  the asymptotic  variance of the coefficients  obtained  with the difference  estimator  rises
(that is, the asymptotic precision  of this estimator  deteriorates). Furthermore, Monte  Carlo
experiments  show that the weakness  of the instruments  produces  biased coefficients  in small
samples. This bias is exacerbated  with the variables' over time persistence, the importance  of the
specific-effect,  and the smallness  of the time-series  dimension. An additional  problem with the
simple  difference  estimator relates  to measurement  error:  Differencing  may exacerbate  the bias due
to errors in variables by decreasing  the signal-to-noise  ratio (see Griliches  and Hausman, 1986).
To confront these conceptual  and statistical concerns, we use alternative  estimators. Blundell
and Bond (1997) suggest the use of Arellano  and Bover's (1995) system estimator  that -- based on
asymptotic  and small-sample  properties  -- reduces  the potential  biases and imprecision  associated
with the usual difference estimator. Arellano  and Bover (1995)  present an estimator  that combines,
in a system, the regression in differences  with the regression in levels.  The instruments  for the
regression  in differences are the same  as above (i.e., the lagged levels of the corresponding,
variable),  so that, the moment  conditions  in equations (4) and (5) apply to this first part of the
system. The instruments  for the regression  in levels are the lagged differences  of the corresponding
variables. These are appropriate instruments  under the following  additional  assumption:  although
there may  be correlation between the levels of the right-hand side variables and the country-specific
effect in equation (2), there is no correlation  between the differences  of these variables  and the
country-specific  effect.  This assumption  results from the following  stationarity  property,19
+[i,t+p  V7i  ] =  E[yi,,t+ -7/i  ](6)
and E[Xj,t+p  * i]=E[Xi,t+q,  i7I foralilpandq
Therefore, the additional moment  conditions  for the second  part of the system (the regression  in
levels)  are given by the following  equations:13
E[(Yi,,--  Yi,t-s-1)  (7i  +ei,t)]  =  0  fors=  1  (7)
E[(Xi,t-s-Xi,t-  s-)  -(1i  + ei,t)]  =  0  fors=  1  (8)
Thus, we use the moment conditions  presented  in equations (4), (5), (7), and (8) and employ
a Generalized  Method of Moments (GMM)  procedure  to generate consistent and efficient  estimates
of the parameters  of interest (Arellano  and Bond, 1991; and Arellano  and Bover, 1995).14
The consistency  of the GMM estimator  depends  on whether lagged  values of per capita GDP
and the other explanatory  variables are valid instruments  in the growth regression. To address  this
issue we consider three specification  tests suggested  by Arellano  and Bond (1991), Arellano  and
13 Given  that lagged  levels are used as instruments  in the differences  specification,  only the most recent difference  is used
as instrument  in the levels  specification.  Using  other lagged  differences  would  result in redundant moment  conditions.
(see Arellano  and Bover 1995)
4  We are grateful  to Stephen Bond for providing  us with a program to apply his and Arellano's estimator  to an
unbalanced  panel data set.20
Bover  (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997). The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions,  which tests the overall validity of the instruments  by analyzing the sample analog  of the
moment  conditions  used in the estimation  process. The second test examines the hypothesis  that the
error term ejj  is not serially correlated.  In the both the difference  regression and the system
difference-level  regression  we test whether the differenced  error term is second-order  serially
correlated  (by construction, it is likely that this differenced  error term be first-order serially
correlated  even if the original error term is not).  The third test is the difference Sargan statistic,
which tests the additional set of restrictions of the system estimator. This "difference"  Sargan  statistic
is asymptotically  distributed  as Chi-square  under  the null  hypothesis  of validity  of the  additional
instruments." 5 Failure to reject the null hypotheses  of these  tests gives support to the model.
B. Results
The dynamic  panel estimates  suggest  that financial  intermediary  development  exerts  a large,
positive  causal  impact  on economic  growth. Table  4 presents  the results using the difference  and
system  estimators  described  above. We also present  the results  when the panel estimation  is ]performed
purely  in levels  for comparative  purposes. In Table  4, only  the results on the financial  indicators  are
given. Table  5 gives  the full results from system  dynamic-panel  estimation. The analysis  was conducted
with two conditioning  information  sets. The first  uses the simple  conditioning  information  set, which
includes  initial  income  and educational  attainment. The second  uses the policy  conditioning  information
set, and includes  initial  income,  educational  attainment,  government  size, openness  to trade, inflation,
lS  The degrees  of freedom  of the "difference"  Sargan test is given  by the number  of additional  restrictions  in the system
estimator  (which  is given by the difference  between  the number  of degrees  of freedom  of the system  estimator  and that of
the difference  estimator).21
and the black market  exchange  rate preniium.  16 Table 5 also presents  (1) the Sargan  test, where  the null
hypothesis  is that the instrumental  variables  are uncorrelated  with  the residuals  and (2) the serial
correlation  test, where  the null  hypothesis  is that the errors in the differenced  equation  exhibit  no
second-order  serial  correlation.
The three financial  intermediary  development  indicators  (LIQUID  LIABILITIES,
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK,  and PRIVATE  CREDIT)  are significant  at the 0.05 significance
level in the levels,  difference,  and system dynamic  panel growth  regressions,  with one exception. The
coefficient  on LIQUID  LIABILITIES  is insignificant  in the difference  dynamic  panel growth  regression
with the policy  conditioning  information  set. While  this may  indicate  a somewhat  less robust link  when
using a purely  "size"  measure  of financial  intermediary  development,  LIQUID  LIABILITIES  enters the
levels  and system  dynamic  panel  growth regressions  significantly  in all specifications.  Put differently,
after controlling  for country-specific  effects, endogeneity,  and  potential  problems  associated  with lagged
dependent  variables  and  weak instruments,  the data suggest a strong,  positive,  link  between financial
intermediary  development  and economic  growth. Furthermore,  there is no evidence  of second  order
serial  correlation  and the regressions  pass the Sargan specification  test. In the  system dynamic  panel
estimates,  we do not reject  the difference  Sargan  test; that is, we do not reject  the assumption  that the
country-specific  effect  is uncorrelated  with the differences  of the regressors. It is also worth noting that
many  of the other regressors  also enter significantly  with the expected  signs  (Table 5).
The regression  estimates  are also economically  large. As shown  the coefficients  that emerge
from the dynamic  panel estimation  are very close to those that we obtain  from  the purely cross-section,
instrumental-variable  estimation.  For example,  PRIVATE CREI)IT  has a coefficient  of 2.5 in the cross-
16 We  do not  use  the  full  conditioning  information  set with  data  on political  and institutional  variables  in the  panel
estimates. These  variables  frequently  have  very limited, if any, time-dimension.22
section  results (the simple  conditioning  information  set regression  in Table  3), while  PRIVATE
CREDIT  has a coefficient  of 2.24 in the system  dynamic-panel  results  reported in Table  4.17  As noted
earlier,  these coefficients  suggest  that exogenous  changes  in financial  intermediary  development  imply
large changes  in economic  growth.
C. Sensitivity  Analyses and Discussion
The dynamic  panel  results are also robust  to a variety of sensitivity  analyses. For instance,  when
we use alternative  measures  of financial  intermediary  development  (deposit  money  bank credit  to the
private  sector divided  by GDP;  and the ratio of total deposit  money  bank domestic  assets  to GDP), we
still  find  a strong, causal  relationship  between finance  and growth. Furthermore,  if we control  for terms
of trade changes  and population  growth,  we obtain  virtually  identical  results  to those reported in Tables
4 and 5*is  Finally,  when we include  the legal origin  variables  as instruments  in the dynamic  panel
estimates,  we still find  that financial  intermediary  development  exerts a large, causal  impact  on
economic  growth.
"  There is some  divergence  in coefficient  estimates  between  the system dynamic  panel estimates,  Table 4, and the cross-
sectional  IV regressions,  Table  3, when the conditioning  information  set is expanded  to include  the policy  conditioning
information  set. The cross-section  regression  produces  a coefficient  estimate  of 3.2 on  PRIVATE  CREDIT,  while the
panel yields  a coefficient  of 1.4. Besides  exploiting  the time-series  dimension  of the data, the dynamic-panel  also
recognizes  the endogeneity  of the other regressors,  which  may help account  for the different  coefficient  estimates.
18 Note,  that in the system dynamic  panel regressions  with the policy  conditioning  information  set, the number  of
instrumental  variables  is larger  than the number  of cross-sectional  observations  (i.e.,  countries). This "over-fitting"  of
the data can bias the t-statistics  upwards. This arises when the variance-covariance  matrix  is constructed  from the first-
stage residuals  in order to allow  for non-spherical  distributions  of the error term - and thereby  get more  efficient  estimates
in the second  stage. (However,  this "over-fitting"  problem  does not plague (a) the simple  conditioning  information  set
regressions,  or (b) the level or difference  estimators  because  there are many more  countries  than instruments  in these
specifications.)  More generally,  the two-step  GMM  estimator  sometimes  converges  to its asymptotic  distribution  only
slowly. Thus,  we also considered  the first-stage  results,  which assume homoskedasticity  and independence  of the error
terms. These first-stage  results  also indicate  that financial  intermediary  development  exerts a causal  impact  on economic
growth.23
IV. Searching  for Determinants  of Financial  Intermediary  Development
The last two sections  presented  evidence  consistent  vwith  the view that financial  intermediation
exerts a positive,  economically  large  impact  on long-run  economic  growth. This  section  undertakes  a
linmited  -- more speculative -- search of potential legal and accounting determinants of financial
intermediary  development.  '9  This exploratory  search shows  that newly  available  information  on
particular  features of national  legal systems  and accounting  standards  are closely  associated  with cross-
country  differences  in financial  intermediary  development.  AEter  describing  the empirical  measures  of
the legal  and accounting  environment,  we study  the connection  between the legal environment  and
financial  intermediary  development  and  then trace this link through to long-run  growth.
A. The legal and accounting environment
This  paper uses three indicators  to characterize  differences  in national  legal  and regulatory
systems:  the legal rights of creditors,  the soundness  of contract enforcement,  and the level  of corporate
accounting  standards. 20
1. Creditor rights
The ability  of financial  intermediaries  to persuade firms  to pay their loans  differs  across  national
legal systems. Legal systems  differ  in terms of the rights of financial  institutions  to repossess  collateral
or liquidate  firms  in the case of default. Legal systems  vary in terms of the rights  of creditors  to remove
19  Also, note that evidence on the determinants of financial intermediary  development is informative regardless of
causality.  Financial intermediaries  may affect business-cycles [Bernanke and  Gertler 1989,1990; Williamson 1987] and
North (1981) notes that understanding  the evolution of key institutions,  such as financial institutions, is critical for
understanding the complex process of economic development.
20 The legal data are available for 44 countries in our sample.  In section II, we did not use these as instrumental variables
because legal codes, enforcement quality, and accounting standards may be influenced by economic development.  Thus,
we feel comfortable arguing - and  specification tests did not reject this argument - that legal origin is an exogenous
endowment.  We feel a bit less comfortable arguing that economic growth does not affect accounting standards.
Nonetheless, we employ these legal data as instruments below to show that particular  features of the legal environment are
strongly linked with both financial  sector performance and long-run grovvth.24
managers  in corporate reorganizations.  Finally,  legal systems  differ  in terms of the priority  given  to
secured  creditors  relative  to other claimants  in corporate  bankruptcy.
More specifically,  this paper uses  four measures  of the legal rights of banks.
AUTOSTAY  equals one if a country's  laws impose  an automatic  stay on the assets  of firms
upon filing  a reorganization  petition. AUTOSTAY  equals  0 if this restriction  does not appear  in the
nation's legal codes. The restriction  would  prevent  creditors  from gaining  possession  of collateral  or
liquidating  a firm  to meet a loan obligation. Thus, all else equal,  AUTOSTAY  should  be negatively
correlated  with the activities  of credit  issuing  intermediaries.
MANAGES  equal one if firm  managers  continue  to administer  the firm's affairs  pending  the
resolution  of reorganization  processes,  and zero otherwise. In some countries,  management  stays  in
place  until  a final  decision  is made about  the resolution  of claims. In other countries,  manage:ment  is
replaced  by a team selected  by the creditors. If management  stays  pending  resolution,  this reduces
pressure  on management  to pay creditors. Thus, MANAGES  should  be negatively  correlated  with the
activities  of credit  issuing  intermediaries.  Here it is important  to highlight  a substantive  wealness with
AUTOSTAY  and MANAGES. They  do not measure  the efficiency  of the legal and regulatory  system
in coping  with bankruptcy. For instance,  two countries  could have  very similar  legal codes,  such  that
management  stays  in place pending  the resolution  of a bankruptcy  hearing and there is an automatic  stay
on the assets of a firm  until the reorganization  petition  is processed  by the bankruptcy  courts. However,
the two countries  legal and regulatory  systems  may  process bankruptcy  and reorganization  very
differently.  One country's system  may  take a long-time  and be subject  to great uncertainty.  T'he  other
may  be very rapid, efficient,  and transparent. Thus,  a major difference  across countries  may  be the25
quality  of the bankruptcy  system,  not the laws themselves.  Currently,  there do not exist  cross-country
measures  of the speed,  transparency,  and fairness  of bankruptcy  systems.
The third measure  of the legal rights of credits  is SECURED  1, which  equals one if secured
creditors  are ranked  first in the distribution  of the proceeds  that result from the disposition  of the assets
of a bankrupt  firm. SECURED  1 equals zero if non-secured  creditors,  such as the government  or
workers  get paid  before secured creditors. In cases  where  SEC(URED1  equals zero, this certainly
reduces  the attractiveness  of lending  secured  credit. SECURED  1 should  be positively  correlated  with
activities  of intermediaries  engaged in secured  transactions,  holding  everything  else constant.
CREDITOR  is a cumulative  index of these creditor  rights  indicators  and equals CREDITOR  =
SECURED  1 - AUTOSTAY - MANAGES.  CREDITOR takes on values between 1 (best) and -2
(worst). 2'  One  would expect countries  with higher  values  of C(REDITOR  to have stronger  creditor
rights  and better-developed  financial  intermediaries,  all else equal.
Table  6 gives  summary  statistics  on CREDITOR. As shown  there is substantial  cross-country
variation  in CREDITOR,  where the maximum  value  is 1, the minimum  value is -2, and the standard
deviation  is about 1. Brazil,  Colombia,  France,  Mexico,  Peru, and the Philippines  (all countries  with a
French  legal origin)  are countries  where CREDITOR=-2,  indicating  that their legal systems  do not
stress the rights  of creditors. In contrast,  the legal codes  of Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,  Israel,
Korea, Malaysia,  Nigeria,  Pakistan, Singapore,  Thailand,  United  Kingdom,  and Zimbabwe  stress  the
rights  of creditors,  such  that CREDITOR=  1. CREDITOR  is an indicator  of legal codes,  however,  it
does not incorporate  information  regarding  enforcement.
2. Enforcement
21 We could have  redefined  AUTOSTAY  and MANAGES  such that values  of one indicated  stronger (instead  of weaker)
creditor  rights. This would  have produced  values  of CREDITOR  between  0D  and 3 and would  not have altered  the results.
We did not do this for consistency:  the variables  in this paper are defined  the same as the variables in LLSV  (1997,1998).26
The laws governing secured creditors will affect secured creditors only to the extent that the
laws are enforced.  Consequently, measures of the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts
are included from LLSV (1998).
RULELAW is an assessment of the law and order tradition of the country that ranges from 10,
strong law and order tradition, to  1, weak law and order tradition. This measure was constructed by
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and is an average over the period 1982-1995.  Given the
contractual nature of banking, higher values of the RULELAW are likely to positively influence
banking development.
CONRISK is an assessment of the risk that a government will - and therefore can - modify a
contract after it has been signed.  CONRISK ranges from 10, low risk of contract modification, to  1,
high risk of contract modification.  Specifically, "modification" means either repudiation, postponement,
or reducing the government's financial obligation.  This measure was constructed by ICRG and is an
average over the period 1982-1995.  Legal systems that effectively  enforce contracts will tend to
support banking activities.
ENFORCE equals the average of RULELAW and CONRISK. The empirical analyses focus on
this aggregate index of the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts, ENFORCE., and the
aggregate index of creditor rights, CREDITOR.
Summary statistics on ENFORCE are given in Table 6.  As shown, there is substantial cross-
country variation in ENFORCE, where the maximum value is 9.99, the minimum  value is 3.55, and the
standard deviation is 2.2.  The countries with very high values of enforcement, values of ENFORCE
greater that 9, are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In contrast, countries where contract27
enforcement  is poor, values  of ENFORCE  less  than 5, include  Colombia,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Philippines,
Peru, and  Zimbabwe.
3. Accounting  standards
Information  about corporations  is critical  for exerting  corporate  governance  and
identifying  the best investments.  Accounting  standards  that simplify  the interpretability  and
comparability  of information  across  corporations  will simplify  financial  contracting.  Furthermore,
financial  contracts  that use accounting  measures  to  trigger paiticular  actions  can only  be enforced  if
accounting  measures  are sufficiently  clear. Accounting  standards  differ  across  countries  and
governments  impose  an assortment  of regulations  regarding  inrFormation  disclosure. Since  accurate
information  about corporations  may  improve  financial  contracting  and intermediation,  the paper
examines  a measure  of the quality  of information  disclosed  through  corporate accounts  from LLSV
(1998).
ACCOUNT  is an index  of the comprehensiveness  of company  reports. The maximum  possible
value is 90 and the minimum  is 0. The Center for International  Financial  Analysis  and Research
assessed  general  accounting  information,  income statements,  balance  sheets,  funds  flow statement,
accounting  standards,  and stock  data in company  reports in 1990. We expect  ACCOUNT  to be
positively  correlated  with financial  intermediary  development."  As shown  in Table  6, ACCOUNT
exhibits  substantial  cross-country  variation. The maximum  value is 83, Sweden,  while  the minimum
22  This  is not  necessarily  true  and raises  the  need  for  a general  conceptual  qualification.  An economy  with  perfect
information,  perfect  contract  enforcement  and perfect  legal  codes  (i.e.,  and  economy  with  essentially  zero  transaction  and
information  costs)  would have  little  reason  for  financial  intermediaries.  PFut  differently,  market  frictions  motivate  the
emergence  of financial  intermediaries,  e.g., Boyd  and  Prescott  (1986).  Conceptually,  this implies  that at vely  high  levels
of legal  system  development  and  information  dissemination,  a marginal  increase  in legal  efficiency  or information  quality
may  cause  a reduction  in the  role  and  importance  of  financial  intermediaries.  However,  quadratic  expressions  for
ACCOUNT  and CONRISK  never  entered  significantly.28
value in our sample  is Egypt (24). The United  States has a value of 71, which  is well  above the mean
value of 61.
B. Determinants  of Financial  Intermediary  Development  and Growth
This section examines  the links  between  the legal environment  and financial  intermediiary
development  and traces this link through  to long-run  growth. First, note that the legal origin  variables
help explain  cross country  differences  in creditor  rights, enforcement  quality,  and accounting  standards.
As shown  by LLSV (1998), English  legal  tradition  countries  have laws that emphasize  the rights  of
creditors  to a greater degree than  the French,  German,  and Scandinavian  countries. French  civil  law
countries  protect creditors  the least,  with German  and Scandinavian  civil  law countries  falling)  in the
middle. In terms of enforcement  quality,  countries  with a French legal heritage  have  the lowest  quality
of law enforcement,  while countries  with German  and Scandinavian  legal traditions  tend to be the best
at enforcing  contracts.  Finally,  LLSV  (1998) show  that countries  with an English  legal  tradiition  tend
to have  much  better accounting  standards  than French or German  civil  law countries.
Table  7 shows  that cross-country  differences  in creditor  rights, enforcement  quality,  and
accounting  standards  help explain  cross-country  differences  in financial  intermediary  development,  even
after controlling  for the level of income  per capita. Jointly,  the variables  CREDITOR,  ENFORCE,  and
ACCOUNT  explain  a significant  amount  of the cross-country  variation in the three financial
intermediary  indicators  (PRIVATE  CREDIT,  LIQUID  LIABILITIES,  and COMMERCIAL-
CENTRAL  BANK). Each of the legal/accounting  indicators,  however, is not significantly  correlated
with all of the intermediary  measures.  For instance  LIQUIID  LIABILITIES  is most closely  associated
with ENFORCE  and CREDITOR. In turn, COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  and PRIVATE
CREDIT  are very strongly  linked  with  ENFORCE  and ACCOUNT. The basic  message  that emerges29
from Table  7 is that countries  with (i) laws that give a high  piriority  to secured creditors,  (ii)  legal
systems  that rigorously  enforce contracts, and (iii)  accounting  standards  that produce comprehensive
and comparable  corporate financial  statements  tend to have  better developed  financial  intermediaries.
Furthermore,  Table 8 shows  that creditor  rights,  enforcement  quality,  and accounting  standards
influence  financial  intermediary  development,  and that this component  of financial  intermediary
development  positively  affects economic  growth. Specifically,  Table 8 uses CREDITOR,  ENFORCE,
and ACCOUNT  as instrumental  variables  within  the context of the pure cross-country  growth
regression  framework  described  in Section  II above. As shown,  the data indicate  that the component  of
financial  intermediary  development  defined  by particular  characteristics  of the legal and accounting
environment  is positively  associated  with economic  growth. This strong link is robust to changes  in the
conditioning  information  set. While  there are good reasons  to believe  that contract enforcement  and
accounting  standards  may  be influenced  by economic  growth,  these instruments  pass the LM
specification  test. Thus, particular  characteristics  of the legal  and regulatory  regime seem  to influence
economic  growth  by affecting  quality  of financial  intermediation.
B. Discussion  of Causes
While  still speculative,  these findings  (in  conjunction  with those in LLSV 1998) are consistent
with the view  that countries  with particular  legal origins  tend  to create particular  types of laws,
regulations,  and enforcement  mechanisms.  It is these laws,  regulations,  and enforcement  mechanisms
that help  determine  the level of financial  intermediary  development  and thus long-run  economic  growth.
Put differently,  when countries  are endowed with  a certain  legal  heritage, one might view  them  as being
endowed  with a probability  distribution  regarding  the laws,  regulations,  and enforcement  mechanisms
associated  with financial  activities. Thus, for example,  the data suggest  that countries  with a French30
Civil  Code  have  a lower  probability  of selecting  laws that give  a higher  priority to secured  credits,
selecting  accounting  standards  that produce high-quality  corporate  financial  statements,  and rigorously
enforce  contracts  than countries  with English,  German,  and  Scandinavian  legal systems. The resultant
laws, regulations,  and enforcement  mechanisms  then affect  the ability  of the financial  system  to research
firms,  exert  corporate  control, mobilize  savings,  and provide  risk  management  and transactions  services.
While  it is difficult  to change legal origin, the results offer  a strategy  for boosting financial  development
and accelerating  long-run  growth. Countries  can target reforms  that ensure  that lenders  have
confidence  that the legal system  will quickly,  transparently,  and effectively  enforce their claims  against
borrowers  and  that outside  investors  have easy access to high-quality,  comprehensive,  and comparable
information  about firms.
V. Conclusions
This  paper first examined  the issue of causality:  Does  greater financial  intermediary  development
cause  faster  economic  growth? We use two econometric  approaches.  We use a pure cross-sectional,
instrumental  variable  estimator  with one observation  per country. The data are averaged  over the
period 1960-1995.  We also create a panel-data  set, where  we average  the data over each (non-
overlapping)  five-year  period. Thus, data permitting,  there are seven  observations  per country  over the
1960-95  period. With this panel data set, we use a difference  dynamic  panel estimator  developed  by
Arellano  and  Bond (1991)  and Holtz-Eakin,  Newey, and Rosen (1988) and a system dynamic  panel
estimator  developed  and studied  by Arellano  and Bover (1995)  and  Blundell  and Bond (1997)  that
mitigates  some  of the biases  frequently  found when using  the difference  dynamic  panel estimator. Both31
cross-section  and panel-data  results  tell  the same story: financial  intermediary  development  exerts a
statistically  significant  and  economically  large impact  on economic  growth.
Next, we investigate  whether  cross-country  differences  in the legal rights of creditor,  the
efficiency  of contract enforcement,  and accounting  system  stEmdards  help  explain  cross country
differences  in the level of financial  intermediary  development. The results are clear: Countries  with (1)
laws that give a high priority  to secured  creditors  getting the fiull  present  value of their claims  against
firms,  (2) legal systems  that rigorously  enforce  contracts, including  government  contracts,  and (3)
accounting  standards  that produce  high-quality,  comprehensive  and comparable  corporate financial
statements  tend to have  better developed  financial  intermediaries.  The paper's findings  are consistent
with the view that legal and accounting  reforms  that strengthen  creditor  rights, contract  enforcement,
and accounting  practices  can boost financial  intermediary  development  and thereby  accelerate  economic
growth. Due to data limitations,  however,  we do not conduct.  a comprehensive  evaluation  of the
regulatory  determinants  of financial  intermediary  development  [e.g.,  see Calomiris  1989;  Kane
1985,1989;  Barth, Nolle, and Rice 1996;  BIS 1997; Calomiris  and Gorton 1991;  Kroszner  and  Rajan
1994;  and  Kroszner  and Strahan  1996]. Future work would substantially  broaden  and deepen  our
understanding  of the determinants  of financial  intermediary  development  by obtaining  additional
measures  of the legal,  supervisory,  and regulatory  factors that determine  the level of financial
intermediary  development.32
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Data ADgendix
A. Countries in the Sample
*-Not in the 71 country  pure cross-sectional  data set.
*  *-Not in the 74 country  panel data set.
Algeria*  Greece  Panama
Argentina  Guatemala  Papua New Guinea
Australia  Guyana**  Paraguay
Austria  Haiti  Peru
Bangladesh**  Honduras  Philippines
Barbados**  Iceland**  Portugal
Belgium  India  Rwanda*
Bolivia  Indonesia*  Senegal
Brazil  Iran*  Sierra  Leone
Cameroon*  Ireland  South Africa
Canada  Israel  Spain
Central  African  Republic*  Italy  Sri Lanka
Chile  Jamaica  Sudan*
Colombia  Japan  Sweden
Costa Rica  Kenya  Switzerland
Cyprus  Korea  Syria
Denmark  Lesotho*  Taiwan**
Dominican  Republic  Liberia**  Thailand
Ecuador  Malawi*  Togo
Egypt*  Malaysia  Trinidad  and Tobago
El Salvador  Malta**  United  States of America
Fiji**  Mauritius  Uruguay
Finland  Mexico  Venezuela
France  Nepal**  Zaire
Gambia*  Netherlands  Zimbabwe
Germany  New Zealand
Ghana  Nicaragua*
Great Britain  Niger
Norway
PakistanB. Data Sources
1. Log level  and growth  rate of per capita GDP, from Loayza et al. (1997).
2. Government  size is government  expenditures  as share of GDP, from  Loayza et al. (1997).
3. Openness  to trade is the sum of exports and imports  as share  of GDP,  from Loayza et al. (1997).
4. Inflation  rates are calculated  using CPI data from the International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS), line 64.
5. The average  years  of secondary  schooling  in the total population  (15 years  and over) come from
Barro and Lee (1996):
6. Data on the black market  premium  are from World's Currency  Yearbook;  and Adrian  Wood,
Global  trends in real exchange  rates: 1960-84,  WB Discussion  paper no. 35. 1988.
7. Data on Liquid  Liabilities  are calculated  using IFS numbers,  using  the following  method:
{(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t)  + F(t-l)/P_e(t-l)] }/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)]
where  F is liquid  liabilities  (line  551),  GDP is line  99b, P_e is end-of  period  CPI (line  64) and P_a is the
average  annual  CPI.
8. Data on Commercial  versus  Central  Bank are calculated  using IFS  numbers,  using the following
method:
DBA(t)  / (DBA(t) + CBA(t))
where  DBA  is assets of deposit  money  banks (lines  22a-d) and CBA  is central  bank assets (lines 12 a-
d).
9. Data on Private Credit  are calculated  using IFS numbers,  using  the following  method:
((0.  5)*[F(t)/P e(t) + F(t-  1)/P_e(t-  1)]  }/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)]
where F is credit by deposit  money  banks and other financial  institutions  to the private sector (lines
22d + 42d), GDP is line  99b,  P_e is end-of  period CPI (line  64) and P a is the average  CP] for the
year.Table 1: Summary  Statistics:  1960-1995
Financial  Intermediary  Development
Liquid  Commercial-  Private
Liabilities  Central  Bank  Credit
Mean  43.44  78.16  38.29
Median  37.48  83.89  27.01
Maximum  143.43  98.99  141.30
Minimum  9.73  23.72  4.08
Std.  Dev.  25.61  18.26  28.71
Observations  71  71  71
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  = liquid liabilities  of the financial  system  (currency  plus demand
and interest-bearing  liabilities  of banks  and nonbank  financial  intermediaries)  divided  by GDP, times 100.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  = assets of deposti  money  banks  divided  by assets of deposit money banks
plus central  bank  assets,  times 100.
PRIVATE  CREDIT  = credits  by deposit money  banks and other financial  instittutions
to the private  sector  divided  by GDP,  times 100.Table  2: Legal  Origin  and  Financial  Intermediary  Development
Financial Intermediary Development
Liquid Liabilities  Commercial-Central  EPrivate  Credit
C  3.829  0.958  4.506  3.063  4.027  -0.674
(0.000)  (0.081)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.386)
ENGLISH  -0.134  0.249  -0.170  0.022  -0.717  -0.090
(0.325)  (0.038)  (0.002)  (0.716)  (0.002)  (0.646)
FRENCH  -0.434  -0.052  -0.270  -0.078  -0.894  -0.268
(0.001)  (0.703)  (0.000)  (0.152)  (0.000)  (0.190)
GERMAN  0.477  0.683  0.048  0.152  0.401  0.738
(0.016)  (0.000)  (0.100)  (0.010)  (0.076)  (0.002)
INCOME  0.330  0.166  0.541
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Obs.  71  71  71  71  71  71
Prob(F-test)  0.001  0.000  0.040  0.000  0.000  0.000
R-square  0.23  0.44  0.12  0.30  0.26  0.55
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  =  liquid  liabilities  of the  financial  system  (currency  plus demand
and  interest-bearing  liabilities  of banks  and  nonbank  financial  intermediaries)  divided  by GDP, times 100.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  = assets  of deposti  money  banks  divided  by  assets  of deposit  money  banks  plus central  bank  assets,  times 100.
PRIVATE  CREDIT  = credits  by deposit  money  banks  and other  financial  institutions  to  the private  sector  divided  by GDP,  times 100.
Values  for  the  financial  intermediary  development  indicators  are averages  over  the 1960-95  period.
ENGLISH  = English  legal  origin
FRENCH  = Napolenik legal  origin
GERMAN  = German  legal  origin
Scandinavian  legal  origin is  the omitted  category.
INCOME L  Logarithm  of real per capita  GDP  in 1960.Table 3: Financial  Intermediation  and Growth:  Cross-Section  Regressions,  1960-95
Dependent  variable:  Real  Per  Capita  GDP  Growth,  1960-95
Instrumental  variables:  Legal  Origin  Dummy  variables
Regression  Set  #1: simple  conditioning  information  set
Explanatory  coefficient  standard t-statistic P-value  Number  of  J-  LM-test
Variable  error  Observations  Statistic  OIR
PRIVATE  CREDIT  2.515  0.814  3.090  0.003  71  0.00189  0.13
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  10.861  3.086  3.520  0.001  71  0.01626  1.15
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  1.723  0.844  2.041  0.045  71  0.03491  2.48
Regression  Set  #2:  policy  conditioning  information  set
Explanatory  coefficient  standard t-statistic P-value  Number  of  J-  LM-test
Variable  error  Observations  Statistic  OIR
PRIVATE  CREDIT  3.222  1.245  2.589  0.012  63  0.00799  0.50
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  9.641  4.039  2.387  0.021  63  0.0373  2.35
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  2.173  0.908  2.394  0.020  63  0.03799  2.39
Regression  Set  #3:  full  conditioning  information  set
Explanatory  |coefficient  standard t-statistic P-value  |  Number  of  1-  LM-test
Variabie  error  Observations  Statistic  OIR
PRIVATE  CREDIT  3.356  1.150  2.918  0.005  63  0.02239  1.41
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  11.289  3.258  3.465  0.001  63  0.00325  0.20
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  2.788  0.903  3.089  0.003  63  0.03901  2.46
Critical  values  for LM-Test  Qver identifying  Restrictions  (2 d8f.):  10%  4.61;  5%=5.99
Simple  conditioning  information  set:  logarithm  of Initial  income  per capita  and  schooling
Policy  conditioning  Information  set: simple  set, plus  government  size,  inflation,  black  market  premium,  and openness  to trade.
Full  conditioning  information  set: policy  set,  plus Indicatros  of revolutions  and  coups,  political  assassinations,  and ethnic  diversity.
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  = liquid  liabilities  of the  financial  system  (currency  plus  demand
and  interest-bearing  liabilities  of banks  and  nonbank  financial  intermediaries)  divided  by GDP,  times  100.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  = assets  of deposti  money  banks  divided  by assets  of  deposit  money  banks  plus  central  bank  assets,  times  100.
PRIVATE  CREDIT  = credits  by  deposit  money  banks and  other  financial  institutions  to the  private  sector  divided  by GDP,  times 100.Table  4: Financial  Intermediation  and  Growth:  Dynamic  Panel  Regressions,  Summary
Estimator  conditioning  information  set  LIQUID  LIABILITIES  COMMERCIAL  - CENTRAL  BANK PRIVATE  CREDIT  observations
System  estimator simple  2.26  6.257  2.237  359
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
10.4631  [0.3291  10.283)
policy  2.713  2.807  1.448  359
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
[0.4161  10.567]  (0.417]
First  Differences  simple  1.368  2.18  1.601  285
(0.036)  (0.011)  (0.001)
(0.424]  [0.1411  [0.1971
policy  0.365  1.008  0.599  285
(0.467)  (0.001)  (0.001)
[0.279)  10.3581  10.3421
Levels  simple  1.802  6.094  2.151  359
(0.015)  (0.001)  (0.001)
[0.2481  [0.210]  [0.2591
policy  2.919  3.234  2.063  359
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
[0.344)  (0.139)  10.3491
Numbers  in parentheses  are p-values  for the coefficient  and numbers  in brackets  are p-values  for the Sargan-test
simple  conditioning  information  set: logarithm  of  initial  Income  per  capita,  average  years  of  secondary  schooling
policy  conditioning  information  set:  simple  set  plus  government  size,  openness  to  trade
inflation,  black  market  premium
LIQUID  LIABILITIES:  liquid  liabilities  of  the  financial  system  (currency  plus  demand  and
interest-bearing  liabilities  of  banks  and  nonbank  financial  Intermedlalres)  divided  by  GDP
COMMERCIAL  - CENTRAL  BANK:  assets  of  deposit  money  banks  divided  by
assets  of  deposit  money  banks  plus  central  bank  assets
PRIVATE  CREDIT:  credit  by  deposit  money  banks  and  other  financial  indtitutions  to
the  private  sector  divided  by  GDPDiff-Sargan  tests
Difference  Sargan Tests
Comparing  the
System  estimator  critical value
with  conditioning  information  set  LIQUID  LIABILITIES  COMMERCIAL  - CENTRAL  BANK PRIVATE  CREDIT  5%  10%
First  Differences  simple  15.195  9.942  13.944  16  26.3  23.54
policy  (using  I instrument  per  variable)  26.39  30.122  33.728  36  50.71  47.12
policy  (using  2 instruments  per  variable)  11.318  13.668  13.43  36  50.71  47.12
Levels  simple  47.362  50.639  53.129  50  67.22  63.07
policy  34.272  24.168  34.37  35  49.52  45.97Table 5: Financial  Intermediation  and Growth:
Dynamic  Panel  Regressions,  System Estimator
Regressors  (1)  (2)  (3)
Constant  0.251  -7.648  2.637
(0.797)  (0.001)  (0r003k
Logarithm  of initial  income  per  capita  -0.799  -0.303  -0.305
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)
Govemment  size'  -0.999  -0.664  -1.614
(0.002)  (0.014)  (0.001)
Openness  to trade'  0.388  0.667  0.634
(0.091)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Inflation 2 1.179  -1.518  -0.41
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.147)
Average  years  of secondary  schooling  0.786  0.559  0.297
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Black  market  premium 2 -1.982  -1.096  -1.072
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Liquid  Liabilities'  2.713
(0.001)
Comm.  vs.  Central  Bank'  2.807
(0.001)
Private  Credit'  1.448
(0.001)
dummy  71-75  -0.984  -0.741  -0.923
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
dummy  76-80  -1.142  -0.805  -1.106
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
dummy  81-85  -3.379  -2.738  -3.107
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
dummy  86-90  -2.555  -1.904  -2.273
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
dummy  91-95  -3.513  -2.744  -3.054
_______________________________  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Sargan  test 3 0.416  0.567  0.417
Serial  correlaffon  test 4 0.607  0.957  0.797
p-values  in parentheses
¶ In the  regression,  this  variable  is included  as log(varable)
2 In the  regression,  this  variable  is included  as log(1  + variable)
3 The null  hypothesis  is  that  the  instruments  used  are  not  correlated  with  the  residuals.
4 The  null  hypothesis  is  that  the  errors  in  the first-difference  regression  exhibit
no  second-order  serial  correlation.Table 6: Summary  Statistics  on the Legal and Accounting  Environment
Legal  and Accounting Environment
CREDITOR ENFORCE ACCOUNT
Mean  -0.3  7.5  61.2
Median  0  8.2  64.0
Maximum  1  10.0  83.0
Minimum  -2  3.6  24.0
Std. Dev.  1.1  2.0  13.5
Observations  44  44  40
CREDITOR index  of secured  creditor  rights.
ENFORCE  = index  of law  and  contract  enforcement.
ACCOUNT  = index  of the  comprehensiveness  and quality  of company  reports
Values  for  the  legal  environment  indicators  are  averages  over  the 1982-95  period.
Values  of accounting  quality  are  assessments  of company  reports  in 1990.Table  7: Legal Environment  and Financial  Intermediary  Development
Financial  Intermediary  Development
Liquid  Commercial-  Private
Liabilities  Central Bank  Credit
c  3.497  2.450  4.112  3.943  2.694  1.557
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)
CREDITOR  0.060  0.101  -0.008  -0.001  -0.034  0.011
(0.328)  (0.034)  (0.759)  (0.947)  (0.591)  (0.852)
ENFORCE  0.217  0.167  0.041  0.033  0.236  0.181
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.000)  (0.000)
ACCOUNT  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.014  0.014
(0.536)  (0.658)  (0.108)  (0.136)  (0.009)  (0.021)
LRGDPSH  -0.181  -0.029  -0.197
(0.096)  (0.454)  (0.103)
Obs.  35  35  35  35  35  35
Prob(F-test)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)
R-square  0.625729  0.593971  0.381852  0.373959  0.634022  0.609374
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  = liquid  liabilities  of  the  financial  system  (currency  plus  demand
and  interest-bearing  liabilities  of banks  and nonbank  financial  intermediaries)  divided  by  GDP,  times  100.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  - assets  of  deposti  money  banks  divided  by assets  of deposit  money  banks  plus  central  bank  assets,  times 100.
PRI.ATE  CREDIT  _ credits by deposl:  money  banks ard otear finandcia;  institutions io the  private secior divided by GDP,  times  100.
CREDITOR index  of secured  creditor  rights.
ENFORCE  = index  of law  and contract  enforcement.
ACCOUNT index  of the  comprehensiveness  and  quality  of company  reportsTable  8: Financial  Intermediation  and  Growth:  Cross-Section  Regressions,  1960-95
Dependent  variable: Real Per Capita  GDP Growth,  1960-95
Instrumental  variables:  Legal  Environment  variables  (CREDITOR,  ENFORCE,  & ACCOUNT)
Regression  1: simple  conditioning  information  set
Explanatory  coefficient  standard t-statistic P-value  Number  of  J-  LMM-test
Variable  error  Observations Statistic  OIR
PRIVATE  CREDIT  1 2.097  0.298  7.032  0.000  35  0.080003  2.80
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  12.734  4.686  2.718  0.011  35  0.073241  2.56
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  2.935  0.499  5.887  0.000  35  0.040316  1.41
Regression  #2:  full  conditioning  information  set
Explanatory  coefficient  standard t-statistic P-value  Number  of  J-  LM-test
Variable  error  Observations Statistic  OIR
PRIVATE  CREDIT  3.325  0.852  3.903  0.001  35  0.030649  2.33
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  8.400  5.008  1.677  0.107  35  0.078816  3.31
LIQUID  LIABILITIES  2.734  0.802  3.410  0.0021  35  0.099216  2.73
Critical  values  for LM-Test  Over  Identifying  Restrictions  ( 2 d.f.  ): 10%  4.61;  5%=5.99
Simple  conditioning  information  set:  logarithm  of  initial  income  per  capita  and  schooling
Full  conditioning  information  set:  simple  set,  plus  government  size,  inftlation,  black  market  premium,  and  openness  to  trade,
and  indicatots  of  revolutions  and  coups,  political  assassinations,  and  ethnic  diversity.
LIQUID  LiABILITIES  = liquid  labilities  of  the  financial  system  (currency  plus  dernand
and  interest-bearing  liabilities  of  banks  and  nonbank  financial  intermediaries)  divided  by  GDP,  tirnes  100.
COMMERCIAL-CENTRAL  BANK  =  assets  of  depostl  money  banks  divided  by  assets  of  deposit  money  banks  plus  central  bank  assets,  times  100.
PRIVATE  CREDIT credits  by  deposit  money  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  to  the  private  sector  divided  by  GDP,  times  100.
CREDITOR  = index  of  secuted  credito  rIghts.
ENFORCE  = Index  of  law  and  contfact  enfotcement.
ACCOUNT  index  of the  comprehensiveness  and  quality  of  company  reporsPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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